Wartime Demand, Peacetime Supply: Europe's Procurement Timeline and Ukraine's Defense After U.S. Retrenchment

Over the past few years, Ukraine has been able to fend off Russia’s advances despite taking heavy casualties. However, it has relied on the European Union’s money and arms, which have mainly come from the United States’ supply and funding. Now, that credibility and assurance of support are under threat. Ukraine’s counteroffensive against Russia has been underway for years, but this summer has been an inflection point for Ukraine’s momentum, and U.S. pullback threatens to derail it because of Ukraine’s military resource deficit. 

Historically, the EU funded Ukraine through U.S. backing, funneling U.S. military assets, support, and information, as well as cash to Ukraine. The U.S.’s new approach is encapsulated in the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy, which recently stated that “the days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” That strategy materialized in May, when Trump announced he would remove 5,000 troops stationed in Germany that were meant to defend Ukraine.

Additionally, in October, the Trump administration undermined Ukraine’s defense by buying Russian diesel, suspending sanctions on Russia, and pressuring Ukraine to stop striking Russian refineries. Meanwhile, a throttling of Starshield, which Elon Musk, the CEO of SpaceX, ordered after consulting administration officials, temporarily grounded the drones Ukraine relies on.

While Ukraine has been able to stave off Russia’s attacks this summer, its increased momentum relies on U.S. arms and military defense infrastructure. Although Europe has the money to fund Ukraine, Ukraine needs short-term solutions and material support in the form of military aid that the U.S. had been supplying since the beginning of the war. This makes the U.S.’s withdrawal so damaging because Europe’s procurement timeline is too long, and Ukraine must capitalize on its positive momentum in the war to win.

Although the U.S. has sent Ukraine a significant amount of money since the beginning of the conflict in 2022, far outpacing the EU’s early contributions, European governments have attempted to close that gap. As U.S. aid steadily winds down, the EU has committed to financing Ukraine through 2027, raising a total of $461 billion in military spending, significantly more than Russia. This is around $27 billion more than the total aid that the U.S. has given Ukraine up to now since the beginning of the war.

Because the EU is doing well economically, they have the ability to finance Ukraine through 2027, at least in terms of liquid assets and investments. This is partly due to new free trade agreements between India and the EU, as well as the EU’s Global Gateway investment program. However, despite its recent wealth, the EU lacks a coordinated defense strategy and cannot meet Ukraine's military needs.

As of October, Ukraine’s most urgent needs include interceptors, artillery, intelligence, and connectivity, which can’t be replaced easily or quickly. When the U.S. gave the most aid, its contributions focused on some of the hardest capabilities to replace quickly. For certain interceptors and air defense systems, the U.S. was one of the only suppliers available, and Europe was buying those systems from the U.S. and moving them to Ukraine.

Musk's withdrawal of Starlink also damaged this capacity, as interceptor drones rely on Starlink's resistance to jamming. Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed that the lack of interceptor deliveries was due to depleted U.S. supplies, calling the interceptors the “most in-demand product right now in the defense field.” Ukraine also relies on the U.S.’s early warning systems against missiles through sensors, aircraft, and human intelligence, which failed on October 13th and 18th due to unknown reasons.

SpaceX's deactivation of the Starlink service caused the drones to fall mid-flight, destroying them and reportedly costing Ukraine tens of millions of dollars. SpaceX’s satellites are virtually irreplaceable, and the next best option, Amazon LEO (a satellite network program created by Amazon), has significantly fewer satellites and was damaged by the explosion of a Blue Origin Rocket.

Ukraine also desperately needs more ammunition, particularly artillery shells, since it has burned through the reserves it had after the U.S.’s deliveries fell. In this field, Europe still can’t close the gap either, with the EU only being able to supply about 2 million of the 3 million rounds Ukraine needs per year.

Over the course of the war, Ukraine has covered around 40% of its own military needs, with Europe covering 30%, and the U.S. covering the remaining 30%. This highlights Ukraine’s strong need for U.S. involvement and military aid, which it has severely lacked. It also underscores the necessity for Europe to rapidly ramp up its actual military assets as opposed to simply investments and cash earmarked for Ukraine. The problem is not only the U.S.’s new hands-off policy in Ukraine, but also the lack of resources from private entities in the U.S., which makes U.S. credibility flimsy and hard for Ukraine to plan around.

While Europe does have some semblance of procurement capacity, production lead times and fragmented capacity mean the gap is getting larger by the month. The lack of weapons procurement is not just a political-will issue in the EU; the delay is structural, given the timeline. Replacing these capabilities will take years, and Ukraine simply does not have the time to wait that long for new capabilities.

No producers can replace the high-end assets that the U.S. was providing, such as PAC-3 and ATACMS, which are described as “beyond critical.” It would take significant time to translate spending, even from the U.S., into new military capabilities Ukraine could use. Since most European defense budgets will remain for domestic use, joint spending initiatives and loans won’t even cover the common command, standards, and logistics Ukraine requires.

This has been a historical problem for Europe, as its arms industry has been underdeveloped for years. The Czech plan for $1.8 million in shells is on too long a timeline and will not meet Ukraine's long-term needs. The most promising avenue for procurement is likely Germany’s model for building long-range weapons inside Ukraine, but even that model is not a guarantee or a short-term solution.

Although Europe has been building up capabilities in response to the U.S.’s recent unreliability regarding support for Ukraine, it is far from able to fully replace the U.S.’s infrastructure or assets. Ukraine relies on the U.S. and Elon Musk’s Starlink and Starshield, and without those, its defense has come to a grinding halt.

The U.S.’s undermining of Ukrainian capabilities through its tentative support of Russia and withholding of key defense assets has hamstrung Ukraine’s counteroffensive in a critical time of need. Ukraine has held on in the short term, but it needs more assets, better coordination, and increased physical aid to keep holding off Russia. Europe’s investment is one step in the right direction towards helping Ukraine, and it has devoted the necessary monetary resources, but its procurement timeline is too long to help Ukraine through the winter. Until European production scales, Ukraine's air defense and drone operations will remain exposed to U.S. supply decisions and warning data that Europe cannot yet replace.

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