Boko Haram’s Return: The Resurgence of Insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin
Blacked out Boko Haram insignia on wall fences in Bama Borno State Nigeria.
Credit: Wikimedia Commons
More than a decade after its peak, Boko Haram, the jihadist military group seeking power in the West African nation of Niger, has once again sprung into headlines across Nigeria and the wider Lake Chad Basin, precisely as international attention and engagement have begun to fade. In March 2025, Niger announced it was withdrawing its troops from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the coalition established by Nigeria, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and later Benin to combat Boko Haram around Lake Chad. This decision followed a broader regional shift, as the United States, long the key external supporter of regional counterinsurgency, completed its full withdrawal from Niger in September 2024. The U.S. departure from Air Base 101 in Niamey, the capital of Niger, as well as the vast Air Base 201 in Agadez, marked the end of a critical surveillance and strike capability in West Africa. Furthermore, France has also scaled back its presence after years of costly counterterrorism campaigns in the Sahel, as mounting tensions with local governments — particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — have dismantled earlier security partnerships such as Operation Barkhane and the G5 Sahel framework.
Despite these withdrawals, the dynamics driving Boko Haram’s endurance have remained largely unchanged. Years of counterinsurgency have scattered the group, but without sustained pressure and coordination against Boko Haram, the insurgency has continued to reemerge, often deadlier than before. This tenacity underscores Boko Haram’s ability to survive fragmentation and adapt to shifting conditions, driven by a relentless ideology and entrenched local networks. By mid-2025, the group had proven that it is not a spent force but a persistent threat, able to exploit security vacuums and political fractures. With fewer international actors engaged and regional coalitions under strain, Boko Haram and ISWAP appear poised to extend their campaign of violence, leaving the Lake Chad Basin on the edge of prolonged instability.
Though weakened by years of internal splits and the death of its notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau, in 2021, the group’s remnants and its stronger offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), stepped up attacks in 2025. This renewed wave of violence has targeted soldiers, civilians, and infrastructure, underscoring the resilience of jihadist militancy in the region.
In Nigeria’s Northeast, particularly in Borno State, Boko Haram and ISWAP have mounted increasingly bold raids against military positions. In March 2025, Reuters reported that fighters attacked two Nigerian bases, burning vehicles and seizing supplies before retreating into rural strongholds. By April, observers warned of a broader surge in insurgent activity that suggested a potential comeback in areas once thought relatively secure.
The human toll has been severe. In June 2025, a suspected female suicide bomber detonated explosives at a crowded gathering near Maiduguri, killing at least 12 people and wounding many more. Only months later, Boko Haram militants stormed a rural village in Borno State, massacring residents and leaving more than 70 bodies scattered in the streets. Al Jazeera described it as one of the bloodiest single attacks in recent years, highlighting the group’s enduring ability to terrorize isolated communities.
Without the support of external allies, regional forces, while experienced, lack the intelligence, air support, and logistical backing that American and French assets once provided. The MNJTF continues to operate with Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon, but Niger’s withdrawal has fractured its basin-wide scope. Meanwhile, attacks like those in Maiduguri and Borno villages show that civilians remain deeply vulnerable to the insurgents’ campaign of terror.
Moreover, the violence is not confined to Nigeria. Fighters continue to move across porous borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, destabilizing already fragile regions. In many ways, this moment encapsulates the cyclical nature of the Boko Haram conflict. Years of counterinsurgency can scatter the group, but without sustained pressure and coordination, the insurgency reemerges—often deadlier than before. The loss of international support, the fracturing of regional alliances, and the persistent instability across the Lake Chad Basin all suggest that the current resurgence is not an isolated flare-up but part of a recurring pattern. Unless regional states and their partners develop a durable framework that addresses governance, development, and security together, the region risks reliving the same destructive cycle for years to come.